Simplicity, rule character and insertion in practices

Abstract

The Fregean approach to concepts assumes the existence of logically simple entities. For such beings isn’t possible to give a proper definition: being simple they cannot be decomposed. Simple entities are also a feature of the logical atomism inWittgenstein’s Tractatus (1921). They function as a requirement for establishing the sense of a proposition. Lacking definition, logically simple entities must be understood, according to Frege (1892), by means of tips or clues [Winke] directed to an interlocutor. For the early Wittgenstein, the understanding of the meaning of simple is given through elucidations [Erläuterungen]. Such a concept seems to refer to Frege (1906), as he delegates to elucidations the task of enable our understanding of indefinables. A clarification of these basic notions aims to bring a diverse approach to the admission of simple as metaphysical entities. Instead of accepting that Erläuterungen clarify logical objects, we treat them as instructions aiming at the introduction of individuals in a specific practice. Consequently, this initiation assumes practical and interactional aspects. The reflection about simple entities in the laterWittgenstein (1953) is used as theoretical leitmotif , in such a way that the discussion on the existence of entities gives place to the examination of the normative role played by a simple term in a language game. Such a function expresses the rule character of simplicity and doesn’t commit us to the existence of any essentially simple entities.