Tarski’s definition of truth
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61378/enun.v4i2.76Keywords:
Tarski, truth, T-schema, indefinability of truth.Abstract
The aim of this text is to present, in a technically accessible way, Tarski’s definition of truth, the indefinability theorem, and to discuss two aspects of Tarski’s work on truth, namely, whether or not the definition captures the notion of truth as correspondence, and Kripke’s objection to the hierarchy of languages.
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